My Pay is Too Bad (I Quit). Your Pay is Too Good (You're Fired) by Kuhn, Johan Moritz
 
WORKING PAPER  07-5 
Johan Moritz Kuhn 
 
My Pay is Too Bad (I Quit). Your Pay is Too 
Good (You’re Fired) 
 






ISBN  9788778822093  (print) 




My Pay is Too Bad (I Quit) 




Johan Moritz Kuhn 
 
 








This paper is about how surpluses of labour contracts are shared by the employee and her 
firm. For this purpose, I look at the relationship between individual wages and employer-
employee separation patterns. The paper suggests a model which estimates (otherwise 
unobserved) alternative wage and individual productivity measures from matched 
employer-employee data. These estimates can be used to address rent sharing hypotheses. 
Results of an application of the model to a large Danish register data set suggest that 
firms appropriate large shares of the returns to tenure. There is no evidence of gender 
discrimination with respect to rent sharing, and no evidence of rent sharing coefficients 
being different across regions which are distinguished by their labour market thickness. 
 
 
JEL codes: J3, J6 
 
Keywords: employer-employee separations, rent sharing 
 
 
♣Thanks for helpful comments to Tor Eriksson, Bjarne Brendstrup, Paul Bingley, 
Astrid Wuertz, Michael Rosholm, Thomas Dohmen, Uwe Sunde, Pedro Martins and Tim 
Barmby. 
♣♣Contact address: Silkeborgvej 2, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark; e-mail: jmk@asb.dk 
 You are paid more than you are required to do your job, but less
than you are worth to your employer (McLaughlin (1994)).
1 Introduction
With frictions on the on labour market, wage diﬀerentials may to some extent
be explainedbydiﬀerences in how the surpluses of labour contracts are shared
between the employer and the employee. On this grounds, hypotheses have
been developed regarding discrimination, the sharing of the returns to tenure,
etc., suggesting that deviations from competitive wage setting take diﬀerent
forms for diﬀerent employees.
Testing these (rent-sharing) hypotheses is basically a measurement issue:
one needs to relate actual wages with individuals’ alternative wages and
marginal productivities. However, in most datasets, only actual wages are
observed.
This motivates this paper, which suggests a way to address this mea-
surement problem using Danish matched employer-employee register data.
For this purpose, I consider the relationship between wage variation and
employer-employee separation patterns. It is argued that the latter depend
on the location of an individual’s wage relative to her alternative wage - i.e.,
the value of the best alternative option - and individual productivity.
A simple empirical model is presented in which separation behaviour is
related to the residuals of a wage regression. The assumption which identiﬁes
the model is that employees with high wage residuals are not only well-paid
relative to their predictions of the wage regression, but also relative to their
alternative wages and productivities. This assumption allows me to use infor-
mation on wages and separations to estimate measures of individual-speciﬁc
alternative wages and productivities. These are then used to address hy-
potheses related to gender discrimination, monopsony in the labour market,
and the sharing of the returns to tenure.
Before estimating of the model, I show that the identifying assumption
of the model is consistent with the data. A simple probit model of the
separation decision reveals that the relationship between the wage residuals
and separation rates is U-shaped, i.e., both ’under-’ and ’overpaid’ individuals
2have the highest separation probabilities1. Further, job-to-job mobility is
associated with wage increases for underpaid, and wage decreases for overpaid
individuals2.
These results may be due to the fact that my large and rich dataset
makes it possible to control carefully for heterogeneity in the wage regression.
They are consistent with the identifying assumption, which suggests that the
quit probability decreases in the wage residual, and the lay-oﬀ probability
increases in the wage residual.3
Relationships between the wage residual and separation probability diﬀer
across groups of employees. This lends itself to the interpretation that em-
ployees diﬀer by how close their wages are located relative to two thresholds:
a lower one, at which the employee would decide to quit, and a higher one,
at which the employer would decide to lay oﬀ.
The empirical model makes this argument explicit, and shows how one can
estimate these thresholds up to a scale. The individual-speciﬁc estimates are
measures of the alternative wage and individual productivity, respectively.
It is possible to compare diﬀerent groups of employees by how their pre-
dicted wages (of the wage regression which was used to generate the residuals)
locate relative to their estimated alternative wage and productivity measures.
Thus, conditional on the assumptions of the model, the results allow to ad-
dress the question whether deviations from competitive wage setting take
diﬀerent forms for diﬀerent employees.
Thus, the novelties of the paper are in the modelling of non-linearities
in wage-separation probability relationships, the explicit treatment of the
link between surplus sharing and lay-oﬀ probability, and the strategy of esti-
mating alternative wage and individual productivity measures from register
data.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
gives some further motivations. Section 3 develops a simple empirical model
of employer-employee separations. Section 4 presents the data and provides
some evidence which is consistent with the assumptions made in Section 3.
1In the following, employees with negative residuals will be characterised as underpaid,
those with positive residuals will be characterised as overpaid.
2This would not be observed if the wage residual was completely determined by un-
observed personal characteristics. In this case, one should observe wage residuals to be
positively (auto-)correlated across jobs.
3In the register data, to which the model will be applied, there is no explicit information
on whether a separation is to be considered a quit or a lay-oﬀ.
3Section 5 presents and discusses results, and Section 6 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Earlier research
To consider the relationship between wage residuals and separation behaviour
relates this paper to other studies on this relationship (e.g., Gielen and van
Ours (2006), Perticara (2004), Pfann (2006)). The determinants of a wage
residual are unknown, and looking at separation patterns in association with
wage residual variation is one way to learn about these determinants. In
particular, one can address the question of whether or not employees with
high wage residuals are paid better relative to productivity or not. No general
picture regarding this issue has emerged so far, which may be a result of
diﬀerences in the precision of the wage predictions and samples.
The estimation of alternative wage and productivity measures links the
results of the paper to the literatures on how actual wages deviate from
the wages one should expect when labour markets were fully competitive.
Here, the paper adds to a study by Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) - which
considers the relationship between wage premia and employee turnover -
by making explicit labour demand and by allowing for nonlinearities in the
wage-separation probability relationship4.
This paper has the same motivation as the rent-sharing literature, within
which a prominent approach to quantify rent sharing parameters is to con-
sider exogenous productivity shocks. This allows to deduce information on
rent sharing coeﬃcients from the extent to which wages react in response to
these shocks; for examples of this literature, see Arai and Heyman (2004),
Blanchﬂower et al. (1996), Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Martins (2004), and
Oswald (1995). Only recently there have been studies of the determinants of
the rent-sharing coeﬃcients, see e.g., Nekby (2003), who distinguishes rent
sharing by gender, or Arai (2003), who considers rent sharing in ﬁrms with
4There is another related study by Rosholm and Skyt-Nielsen (1997), who use intru-
ments to identify quits from lay-oﬀs in register data. The present paper extends their
study by using the probabilities of these events to identify measures of alternative wages
and individual productivities.
4high vs. low capital intensities. This paper is distinguished from this litera-
ture by its treatment of alternative wages.
B e y o n dt h er e n t - s h a r i n gl i t e r a t u r e ,t h e r ei so fc o u r s eaw i d e rl i t e r a t u r eo n
how personal characteristics are related to pay and productivity. Although
there is a large body of research on wages, linking wages to productivity
has proven diﬃcult - mainly because of diﬃculties involved in measuring
individual workers’ productivities. One approach is to relate the results of
regressions of ﬁrms’ wage costs on variables describing the composition of
the employees (say, share of women, share of employees within some age
interval, etc.) with the results of regressions of ﬁrms’ product on the same set
of variables, and compare the coeﬃcients (e.g., Hægeland and Klette(1999),
Hellerstein and Neumark (1995), Hellerstein et al. (1999), Ilmakunnas and
Maliranta (2005)). This ’two regressions’ approach treats employees with
diﬀerent characteristics as substitutes and ignores compositional eﬀects, e.g.,
how the shape of the employee age distribution is related to productivity.
Yet another way to improve upon the precision of the estimates is of course
to use individualized measures of productivity, such as Medoﬀ and Abraham
(1981), who use superiors’ evaluations as a productivity measure, or Oliviera
et al.(1989), who approximate individual productivities by the productivity
of observationally equivalent individuals who are self-employed. Another
example is Suen (2000), who measures the value products of domestic helpers
by their employers’ labour income. Generalizing the results of these studies
is diﬃcult because they consider highly speciﬁc occupations.
2.2 Hypotheses
The motivation for this paper is the question whether diﬀerent groups of
employees get diﬀerent shares of the pies which they are producing in their
ﬁrms. In the following, some examples of prominent hypotheses on this issue
will be considered to illustrate empirical results in later sections, these are:
(1) human capital theory (Becker (1962), Hashimoto (1981)) which states
that senior employees are paid less relative to productivity than young ones,
(2) deferred compensation theory (Lazear (1979), Lazear and Rosen (1981)),
according to which young employees are paid less relative to productivity
than senior ones, and (3) the gender wage discrimination hypothesis (e.g.,
Blau and Kahn (1992), Hellerstein et al. (2002)), stating that women are
paid less relative to productivity compared to men. I will also consider how
(4) the thickness of labour markets aﬀects the surplus sharing rules, in other
5words, whether it is the ﬁr mo rt h ee m p l o y e et h a ti si nas t r o n g e rp o s i t i o ni n
bilateral monopoly situations which arise in thin labour markets (Manning
(2003)).
With regard to theories of gender discrimination, it makes of course a dif-
ference whether ﬁrms pay their female employees less because they value their
female employees less relative to some alternative arrangement, or whether
they succeed in paying women just above their alternative wages (Blackaby
et al. (2005), Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999)). If the former was the case, and
if wage residual variation was partly due to rent extraction, then one should
expect - based on some all-else-conditions - that women with high wage resid-
uals have higher separation rates than men with high wage residuals. This
is because asking for more pay would more strongly increase women’s risk
of being ﬁred compared to men’s. If women’s predicted wages were low rel-
ative to their marginal products, their separation probabilities should only
increase slightly in the wage residual5.
Firm-speciﬁc human capital models (Becker (1962), Hashimoto (1981))
suggest that costs and beneﬁts of speciﬁc human capital are shared over
the tenure of the contract. This implies that the share of the total rents
which is appropriated by the employee decreases over time and ﬂattens the
individual’s wage-tenure proﬁle relative to the productivity-tenure proﬁle.
In contrast to the human capital model, Lazear’s (1979) model of deferred
compensation suggests senior employees to be paid well because of implicit
contracts which aim at increasing younger employees’ loyalty towards the
ﬁrm. In this model, an individual’s wage-tenure proﬁle is steeper than the
productivity-tenure proﬁle.
In the ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital model, employees with low tenure get
a relatively larger share of the pie than would be suggested by the deferred
compensation hypothesis, and employees with high tenure get a relatively
smaller share than would be suggested by the deferred compensation hy-
pothesis. Thus, knowledge of the alternative wage and productivity - and
comparing these with actual wages - allows to make statements regarding the
relevance of the two hypotheses for the present sample6.N o t ea l s ot h a tt h e
5It should be noted that the productivities which are relevant for the lay-oﬀ decision
are the (subjective) assessments of the personnel manager. Discrimination may be either
by disadvantegous rent sharing rules or by biased evaluations of productivity; the current
approach addresses the ﬁrst of the two possibilitites.
6Analysing these relationships may also be motivated by hypotheses related to age and
productivity, e.g., Warr (1994)).
6analysis of diﬀerences in separation rates in association with heterogeneity
in rent extraction parameters can shed light on the selection processes which
determine tenure-wage proﬁles.
Employees in rural areas should have lower quit probabilities (i.e., lower
alternative wages relative to actual wages) than those in densily populated
areas if they - when negotiating wages - can exploit the fact that ﬁrms
have greater diﬃculties to recruit alternative employees. Lay-oﬀ probabil-
ities should be low in rural areas if ﬁrms succeed in paying just above the
alternative wages, i.e., are taking advantage of employees ﬁnding it diﬃcult
to ﬁnd alternative jobs.
A na d d i t i o n a lh y p o t h e s i sw h i c hc a nb ef o r m u l a t e dw i t h i nt h i sf r a m e w o r k
is that the wage elasticity of separation probability should be negatively re-
lated to the contract’s total rent, which is a positive function of asset speci-
ﬁcity, e.g., as a result of speciﬁc investments, and the ﬁrm’s adjustment and
the employee’s mobility costs. For instance, large ﬁxed adjustment and/or
mobility costs decrease the likelihood of separation even for highly over- or
underpaid individuals.
3 A Model of Employer-Employee Separations
3.1 Wages and Separations
The empirical model departs from a simple model of employer-employee sep-
arations with wage-bargaining ineﬃciencies which is closely related to Par-
sons (1972), Farber (1999), and Hall and Lazear (1984). For a contract of
some employee i,i tm u s th o l dt h a tt h ew a g eo fi, wi, is located between two
thresholds. The lower threshold is the minimum wage which is (or would
b e )a c c e p t a b l ef r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e w of the employee. It will be denoted
awi, which is short for i’s alternative wage. The higher threshold is the
highest wage the ﬁrm would be willing to pay for the employee and will be
abbreviated mpi,w h i c hi ss h o r tf o ri’s marginal product.
The next subsection will suggest an empirical strategy to estimate these
thresholds from register data, in which there is no explicit information on
quits vs. lay-oﬀs7.
7In any case, this information would be prone to measurement error.
7It should be kept in mind that using the term ’marginal product’ for the
ﬁrm’s willingness to pay is an approximation, as the maximum acceptable
wage from the ﬁrm’s point of view is also determined by adjustment and
opportunity costs. E.g., severance pay would increase the ﬁrm’s willingness
to pay by making unattractive the ﬁrm’s alternative option, which, in this
case, would be to lay-oﬀ8.
In the following, the term ’alternative wage’ will be used for ’the minimum
acceptable wage from the point of view of the employee’. Again, this is an
approximation; the diﬀerence between the two terms stems from frictions,
mobility costs, say, and unmeasurable job characteristics, e.g., amenities.
Mobility costs may be considered as decreasing the value which is associated
with the best alternative option. Job amenities are equivalent to the employee
associating low value with the alternative option relative to the current job.
The surplus (or match quality) of i’s contract is the diﬀerence
mpi − awi. (1)
Let wi denote the wage of employee i. wi divides the surplus into two
parts. mpi − wi is the ’employer surplus’ which is appropriated by the ﬁrm,
and wi−awi is the ’employee surplus’ which is appropriated by the employee.
Further below, it will be assumed that lay-oﬀ probability is a negative func-
tion of the former, and quit probability is a negative function of the latter.
Employee i does not accept the contract (or quits) if wi−awi < 0;i nt h i s
case i prefers the best alternative. An employer does not hire (or lays oﬀ)
an employee if mpi − wi < 0.
3.2 Empirical Model
The empirical model suggests a way to estimate alternative wages and indi-
vidual productivities from information on wage premia and separation behav-
iour. The ideas behind the model are as follows. There are observationally
equivalent employees in the data who are paid diﬀerent wages. These indi-
viduals have the same predicted wage, but diﬀerent realised wages. Part of
the unexplained variation in the wage residuals is assumed to be due to ran-
domness in rent extraction, i.e., unrelated to these individuals’ alternative
8mpi is exactly equal to i’s marginal product when both adjustment costs and the proﬁt
of the ﬁrm’s alternative option are zero.
8wages and marginal productivities9. Thus, employees with a high wage resid-
ual have on average a higher employee surplus and are less likely to quit, and
generate on average a lower employee surplus and have, as a consequence, a
higher lay-oﬀ probability.
The assumption of observationally equivalent employees having the same
expected alternative wage and marginal product implies that a negative rela-
tionship between wage residuals and separation rates in the data can only be
explained by quit probability being a negative function of the wage residual.
Equivalently, any ﬁnding of a positive relationship between wage residuals
and separation probability could only be explained by lay-oﬀsb e i n ga ni n -
creasing function in the wage residual.
The relationships between wage residuals and separation probabilities
take diﬀerent forms for diﬀerent groups of employees. For illustration, con-
sider a group of employees for whom the separation probability increases
strongly for small positive wage residuals. In this group, having a slightly
better wage than one’s peers strongly increases the probability of being laid
oﬀ. Thus, to be consistent with the data, an estimate of these employees’
marginal products would have to be located close to this group’s predicted
wage.
The following takes these ideas to the data. Estimation is on a cross
section of employees who are employed at census date t, and who either stay
or separate their employer between t and next period’s census date, t +1 .
Let awi,t and mpi,t be the alternative wage and the marginal product of a
speciﬁce m p l o y e ei at t, respectively. mpi,t and awi,t are unobserved and have
to be estimated. For parsimony, in the following I assume wi,t = wi,t+1 = wi.
Although alternative wages and marginal productivities are unobserved,
it must hold that awi,t ≤ wi ≤ mpi,t, as otherwise there would be no contract
at time t. Further, if employee i does not separate between t and t+1,i tm u s t
hold that awi,t+1 <w i <m p i,t+1. If there is a separation, this is because of
either awi,t+1 >w i or mpi,t+1 <w i. These conditions will be exploited for
estimation.
Let
awi,t+1 = awi,t + ηi,1 (2)
9There are a number of informal arguments of why one should observe randomness in
rent extraction. One is the notion that wages are not perfectly ﬂexible. This would imply
that wages are partly determined in the past, e.g., by past employee and ﬁrm characteristics
which are of no relevance with regard to the alternative wage or productivity today.
9and
mpi,t+1 = mpi,t + ηi,2 ,( 3 )
with ηi,1, ηi,2 being unobserved changes in the alternative wage and marginal
product, respectively, that occur between t and t +1 .
Let j =( 1 ,2).T h e ηi,j are assumed independent and normally distrib-
uted with d.f. fj() and c.d.f. Fj(). This implies that the probability of no
separation taking place is
P(no separationi) (4)
= P(awi,t+1 <w i) × prob(mpi,t+1 >w i)
= P(awi,t + ηi,1 <w i) × prob(mpi,t + ηi,2 >w i)
= F1(wi − awi,t) × (1 − F2(wi − mpi,t))
= F1(wi − awi,t) × F2(mpi,t − wi) ,
where the last step follows from symmetry of f2().N o t et h a tF1(wi−awi,t) is
the probability that i does not quit, and F2(mpi,t−wi) is the probability that
i is not ﬁred. These are positive functions of the employee surplus wi −awi,t
and the employer surplus mpi,t − wi, respectively.
For a group of employees with the same expected awt and mpt,w a g e
variation identiﬁes the model. This is the case because only one combi-
nation of estimates for awt and mpt is consistent with a speciﬁc observed
wage-separation rate pattern: for high wages, variation in separation rates
across employees is only weakly related to variation in alternative wages
and strongly related to variation in marginal products. This is because, for
awi,t <w i <m p i,t,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dP(no separationi)
da w i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ = f1(wi − awi,t) × F2(mpi,t − wi) ,
is a negative function of the wage and
dP(no separationi)
dm p i
= F1(wi − awi,t) × f2(mpi,t − wi)
is a positive function of the wage. Thus, separations are more likely to be
a result of changes in the alternative wage (i.e., quits) if wages are low, and
10changes in the marginal product (i.e., lay-oﬀs) if wages are high10.
There are some practical issues regarding the implementation of the model:
First, the estimates of awi,t and mpi,t will be made conditional on a
vector of observables xi,t. This vector includes a constant term, and dummy
variables for gender, region, age, and tenure. At time t,
awi,t = fct1(xi,tβ1)+ε1i,t (5)
and
mpi,t = fct2(xi,tβ2)+ε2i,t, (6)
where fctj() a r es o m ef u n c t i o n s ,t ob es p e c i ﬁed below, and β1 and β2 are
vectors of parameters to be estimated. ε1i,t and ε2i,t are errors. These must
be assumed to be correlated with wage: employees who are earning 1 Danish
Kroner (DKK) more for reasons which are not controlled for in the model
may also be presumed to have a higher alternative wage and/or productivity.
To take account of this, (5) and (6) are modiﬁed as
awi,t = fct1(xi,tβ1)+γ1wi +e ε1i,t (7)
and
mpi,t = fct2(xi,tβ2)+γ2wi +e ε2i,t, (8)
with e ε1i,t and e ε2i,t assumed orthogonal to variation in wi,a n dγ1 and γ2 being
unknown parameters.
Comparisons of the estimates of awi,t and mpi across diﬀerent employees
are made possible by the (important) assumption that γ1 and γ2 are sym-
metric across employees. Further, the identifying assumption of the model
implies the restrictions γ1 < 1 and γ2 < 1: employees who earn DKK1 more
have less than DKK1 higher alternative wage and productivity on average.
10Note further that P(separation) is U-shape in wi for awi,t ≤ wi ≤ mpi,t,a s
d (1 − P(no separationi))/dwi
= −f(wi − awi,t) × F(mpi,t − wi)+F(wi − awi,t) × f(mpi,t − wi).
This, e.g., implies that a strongly negative wage-separation rate relationship is only con-
sistent with (wi − awi,t) being small, and (mpi,t − wi) being large.
11This restriction is not realistic if not the vector of controls, xt,e ﬀectively
controls for variation in alternative wages and marginal productivities. Oth-
erwise, wages would closely follow the alternative wages or productivities,
and γ1 and γ2 would be close to one (in case of which identiﬁcation of the
model is not ensured).
The way I address this problem is by measuring the alternative wage and
the marginal product as deviations from the individual-speciﬁc predicted
wage of an auxiliary wage regression. Thus, the model uses variation in the
wage residual rather than total wage variation to identify the model. This is
because randomness in rent extraction may be assumed to explain a larger
share of the variation in the wage residuals than of the total wage variation.
Inituitively, constructing speciﬁc peer groups allows me to characterise
employees as over- and underpaid relative to their peer-group speciﬁca l -
ternative wage and marginal product. This makes it possible to associate
employees with quit and lay-oﬀ probabilities which are important for the
estimation of the alternative wage and the marginal product measures. An
alternative to using wage residuals w o u l do fc o u r s eb et oi n c l u d eal a r g e
number of control variables in xi,t, but, in practice, this would lead to iden-
tiﬁcation problems.
Consequently, let wi = wi +( wi − wi),w i t hwi being the predicted wage












2(wi − wi)+wi +b ε2i,t , (10)
with b ε1i,t and b ε2i,t capturing unobserved heterogeneity at time t.E q .( 9 )
and (10) assume that the part of the wage variation across individuals which
is explained by the wage regression is competitive. In other words, wi is
assumed to follow a one-to-one relationship with the alternative wage and
the marginal product. On the other hand, deviations from the predicted wage
(i.e., wage residuals), are assumed to be positively correlated with individual
rent sharing parameters. This condition is imposed by the restrictions γ∗
1 < 1
and γ∗
2 < 1, respectively. The next section of the paper will provide empirical
evidence which is consistent with these restrictions.
12Deﬁne aw∗
i,t = awi,t − wi , aw∗
i,t+1 = awi,t+1 − wi, mp∗
i,t = mpi,t − wi,
mp∗
i,t+1 = mpi,t+1−wi and w∗
i = wi−wi.T h i sa l l o w st oe x p r e s st h ee m p l o y e e











1) − μ1i,t+1 ,( 1 1 )











i + μ2i,t+1,( 1 2 )
where μ1i,t+1 = b ε1i,t +η1i and μ2i,t+1 = b ε2i,t +η2i a r ea s s u m e dt ob en o r m a l l y
distributed, with variances σ2
μj. Note that in cross-section data b εji,t and
μji,t+1, cannot be distinguished from each other.
A slightly more important issue is that the variances σ2
μj are unknown, and
cannot be estimated (because γ∗
1 and γ∗
2 are unknown). Just as in any other
binary choice model, some variance normalization is in place to pin down
the coeﬃcient estimates. The approach which is followed here is to deﬁne a
’baseline’ employee, for whom the variance of the unobserved component is
restricted to one. The symmetry assumption regarding the γ∗
j then allows to
estimate the individual speciﬁc error variances σ2
μji of non-baseline employees
by the strengths of the wage-separation relationships.
In particular, let σμjb =1be the standard deviations of the μj,t+1 for
t h eb a s e l i n ee m p l o y e e .L e tσμji = σμjbexp(b xi,tb βj) be the individual speciﬁc
error standard deviations of non-baseline employees, where the exponential
form is chosen to ensure that the estimates are positive. This allows for
heteroscedasticity in unobservables (Harvey (1976)). Individual speciﬁc error
standard deviations are conditional on a vector of observables b xi,t.E x c l u s i o n
of a constant term in b xi,t implies that the estimates of b β1 and b β2 scale the
expected standard deviation of the individual error μji relative the standard
deviation of some baseline employee.
b β1 and b β2 are identiﬁed from the strength of the wage-separation rate
relationships, and the restriction that γ∗
1 and γ∗
2 are symmetric across em-
ployees. If, for a group of employees with similar xi,t and b xi,t, the model
is good at predicting separation rates, this is because of small σ2
h μ1i and/or
σ2
h μ2irelative to the base category’s σ2
h μ1b and/or σ2
h μ2b. Weak wage-separation
rate relationships are reﬂected in large variance estimates relative to the base
category.
13The probability that individual i does not separate between t and t +1

















σμ1b × exp(b xi,tb β1)
>
μ1i,t+1









σμ2b × exp(b xi,tb β2)
>
−μ2i,t+1




exp(e γ1) × w∗










where exp(e γ1)=( 1−γ∗
1)/σμ1b, −exp(e γ2)=( γ∗
2−1)/σμ2b (the exponential
forms are chosen to impose the identifying restrictions) and fctj(xi,te βj)=
fctj(xi,tβ
∗
j)/σμjb. F() is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.
Comparisons of the estimates of the surpluses across employees are possi-
ble by the assumption that the unknown parameters e γ1 and e γ2 are symmetric
across employees. Note that (13) measures (11) and (12) in terms of separa-
tion probabilities rather than monetary units. Obviously, the probability of
observing a separation is
P(separationi)=1− P(no separationi).( 1 4 )
Equations (13) and (14) are employee i’s contribution to the likelihood
function.
It remains to specify fct1() and fct2().N o t et h a tE(f awt+1) < 0 for nor-
mally distributed errors (as E(awi,t) < wi,a n de μ1i has expected value zero)
and E(f mpt+1) > 0. These sign restrictions are imposed in the estimation set-
up to help identiﬁcation of the model, with fct1(.)=E(f awt+1)=−exp(.)
and fct2(.)=E(f mpt+1)= exp(.).
The numerators of (13) are the employee and the employer surplus, re-
spectively. Their ﬁnal speciﬁcation, for which results will be reported, is
employee surplusi=exp(e γ1) × w
∗
i + exp(xi,te β1) (15)
and
employer surplusi=exp(xi,te β2) − exp(e γ2) × w
∗
i .( 1 6 )
14Note the alternative wage estimate is a negative function of e β1.
The set of parameters e βj,e γj,b βj is ﬁt to the data by maximum likelihood.
By (13) and (14), the likelihood function is
L(s |w




{ si × log[prob(separationi)]
+(1− si) × log[1 − prob(separationi)] },
where si takes the value one if individual i separates and zero otherwise, and
N is the size of the sample.
To summarize, (13), (14), and (17) enable me to estimate the most likely
locations of the individual-speciﬁc alternative wages and the marginal prod-
ucts up to an unknown scaling factor, which is assumed to be symmetric
across employees. The estimates are measured in deviations from the pre-
dicted wages of an auxiliary wage regression. e β1 and e β2 are the expected
(percent-wise) diﬀerences in the alternative wage and marginal product rel-
ative to the estimates of some baseline employee, for whom all xi,t,e x c e p t
the constant term, are equal to zero.
4D a t a
Data are from the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research con-
structed by Statistics Denmark. This is a matched employer-employee data
set which covers the entire Danish labour force. Decentralised wage bargain-
ing and discretionary wage setting for almost all occupation groups allows
for randomness in individual rent sharing parameters and makes Danish data
well-suited for this analysis. The data set is collected annually with census
date at end-November and contains a large number of personal background
variables, e.g., demographic and wage information.
The most recent year which was available for this study is 2002; as es-
timation is on a cross-section, explanatory variables will be as of 2001, and
the separation decision will be measured between 2001 and 2002.
In the data set, it is possible to distinguish between ﬁrms and work-
places/establishments, and to observe ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a no n ew o r k p l a c e .
15Ap e r s o ni sd e ﬁned as separating if she both leaves the workplace and the
ﬁrm between 2001 and 2002.
Wage information is from the variable ’timelon’ which measures before-
t a xh o u r l yw a g e si nD K K( DKK1 ≈ USD 0.15). The ’timelon’ variable
comes with a quality index (derived from an estimate of the number of hours
worked in 2001, which is based on information on compulsory pension fund
contributions) which was used to delete observations for which data quality
was suggested to be an issue, e.g., because of low number of recorded working
hours. Still, there remained some outliers (say, employees earning more than
ten times more than the 99th percentile), which were deleted. In particular,
I shaved the sample by dropping upper and lower one-precentiles of the wage
distribution, and, later, by dropping one-percentiles of the wage residual
distribution.
In some of the very small ﬁrms, employees may be setting their own
wages, and the distinction into employer and employees may not always
be meaningful. For this reason, only employees in ﬁrms with at least 10
employees are considered.
O ft h et o t a lp o p u l a t i o no fe m p l o y e e si nD e n m a r k ,t h i sl e a v e s1 , 3 1 7 , 3 8 6
observations. Table 1 describes some of their characteristics (with informa-
tion on the wage residual being from the wage regression described below).
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum
Hourly Wage (DKK) 176.36 55.88 62 456
Wage residual (DKK) -0.67 33.54 -84.7 133.8
Separation 0.18 0.39 0 1
Gender: female 0.48 0.50 0 1
Copenhagen dummy 0.30 0.46 0 1
Age 39.08 9.46 20 55
Tenure 6.76 6.37 1 22
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 1,317,386 observations in 2001-
2002
Wage residuals are generated from a regression of hourly wages on a large
number of background characteristics. These include (number of categories
in parentheses) age (4), gender (2), education (26), occupation (67), labour
union (33), tenure (20), time since ﬁnishing eduation (5), region (2), and
number of children. Further, to control for employer characteristics, regres-
sion is subject to workplace ﬁxed eﬀects.
16The wage regression explains ca. 40 percent of the variation in wages; the
following argues that this is suﬃcient to assume that high wage residual em-
ployees have higher employee surplus and generate a lower employer surplus
than low wage residual employees.
4.1 Wage residuals and employer-employee separations
The variation in the wage residual may be due to unobserved diﬀerences in
alternative wages, productivities, or rent extraction, or some combination of
these three factors.
To discriminate between the diﬀerent explanations, I consider the re-
lationship between the wage residual and separation probabilities and the
relationship between the wage residual and wage growth associated with job-
to-job transitions. To allow for non-linearities between the wage residuals
and the dependent variables, I split up the wage residual into nine dummy
variables for each 11.1th percentile11 and use these dummies as explanatory
v a r i a b l e si nb o t hap r o b i tm o d e lw i t ht h es e p a r a t i o nd e c i s i o nb e i n gt h ed e -
pendent variable and in a simple least squares regression with wage growth
as the left-hand-side variable.
The results of the probit model of the separation decision are displayed
in Table 2.
Table 2: Probit estimates. All observations
Dependent variable: Separation












The relationship between separation rates and the wage residual is U-
shape, with separation rates being lowest at zero or slightly negative values
11The speciﬁc thresholds that deﬁne the wage residual dummies and the number of
dummies are arbitrary. I chose an odd number of categories to use the quantile around
the median as the baseline category.
17of the wage residual: ’over-’ and ’underpaid’ individuals have highest separa-
tion probability12. Separation rates increase slightly at low absolute values,
and are about six to seven percent higher at the tails of the wage residual
distribution compared to the median of the distribution.
To explain this ﬁnding by the presence of rent extraction ( i.e., in the
notation of the foregoing section: daw∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t < 1 and dmp∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t < 1), it
is suﬃcient to assume that observationally equivalent employees (with the
same predicted wage) face similar alternative wage and productivity distrib-
utions: if observationally equivalent employees are restricted to communicate
only the information which is used to construct the wage residuals to poten-
tial employers in the job search process, then they have the same expected
alternative wage. This becomes increasingly realistic the more controls one
includes in the wage regression.
If one is willing to follow this argument, then the ﬁnding of separation
rates being an increasing function of the wage residual for high-wage-residual
employees can only be explained by lay-oﬀ probability being an increasing
function of the wage residual: a person who is paid more by DKK1 compared
to another observationally equivalent employee does not have DKK1 higher
productivity in the eyes of the ﬁrm. Put diﬀerently, the wage residual is
positively correlated with employee surpluses, and negatively correlated with
the employer surplus.
In principle, one could try to explain the ﬁnding of a U-shape relationship
between the wage residual and separation rates as being driven by the pres-
ence of proﬁt sharing, i.e., daw∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t > 1 and dmp∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t > 1.H o w e v e r ,
this would require an argument that the better a person is paid relative to her
peers, the less happy she is for her job. Otherwise, one cannot explain that
overpaid individuals have separation rates increasing in the wage residual.
Although assuming daw∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t < 1 and dmp∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t < 1 is suﬃcient to
interpret the U-shape of the wage-separation probability relationship as due
to rent extraction, part of the variation in the wage residual may still be due









i,t =0;t h i s ,h o w e v e r ,s h o u l d
presumably be reﬂected in still stronger wage-separation rate-relationships
12This ﬁnding puts into perspective the assumption of a negative relationship between
wage and separation probability, which underlies the on-the-job-search-literature (e.g.,
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Christensen et al. (2005)).
18than those suggested in Table 2. As a consequence, the derivatives may be
assumed to be strictly positive, i.e., γ∗
1 > 0 and γ∗
2 > 0.
Randomness in rent extraction implies that separations at the low end of
the wage residual distribution are more likely to be quits, and separations
at the high end of the distribution are more likely to be lay-oﬀs. A testable
implication of this is that wages of job-shifters should increase when being
underpaid before moving, and decrease when being overpaid before moving13.
If the wage residual was purely explained by unobservable characteristics that
determine the alternative wage and the individual productivity, underpaid
(overpaid) inviduals should be underpaid (overpaid) in their next job as well,
and no relationship between the wage residual and wage growth when shifting
job should be found.
Dependent variable: Wage growth 2001-2002 (in per cent)











Table 3: Least squares regression estimates. All job-to-
job transitions 2001-2002 (170,329 observations)
Coefficient
Table 3 presents evidence that this is not the case. Instead, there is
a strong negative relationship between the wage residual and wage growth
when moving to a new employer. For those who change employer, alterna-
tive wages are as much as 21.6% higher than wages at the old employer for
strongly underpaid individuals, and 18.4% percent lower for strongly over-
paid individuals14. This again suggests daw∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t < 1 and dmp∗
i,t/dw∗
i,t < 1,
and implies that it is meaningful to distinguish between quits and lay-oﬀs15.
13Thanks to Pedro Martins for pointing this out.
14There is also a negative relationship between wage residuals and wage growth for
employees who stay with their employer. However, the relationship is about three times
stronger for movers compared to stayers, so this does not challenge the interpretation of
Table 3.
15Note further that raiding of high ability employees (Lazear (1986)) is not suggested
19To address heterogeneity in wage-separation relationships, Table 4 presents
results of a probit regression similar to the one of Table 2. The model of Ta-
ble 2 has been modiﬁed in two ways: ﬁrst, interactions of the wage residual
dummies and observable characteristics are included to allow for diﬀerences in
the relationships between wage residuals and separation probabilities across
diﬀerent employees. Second, to reduce the number of controls in the regres-
sion (and to increase robustness of estimates), the number of wage residual
quantiles which deﬁne the wage residual dummies was reduced from nine to
ﬁve.
Results are as follows: There is evidence that relationships between wage
residuals and separation probabilities are not symmetric across diﬀerent groups
of employees. In particular, women have lower separation rates, but these
are increasing at a higher pace when the wage residual increases in absolute
value. The fact that their wages are an important predictor of separations
suggests relatively low unobserved heterogeneity in alternative wages and
marginal productivities - which would otherwise blur the wage-separation
probability relationships.
Separation rates of young and short-tenured employees are high, but do
not react strongly to variation in the wage residual. Over- and underpaid
employees do not have much higher separation rates than employees with
zero wage residual.
Separation rates are decreasing in age. Employees above the age of 50
years have separation rates increasing more than the baseline employee when
underpaid. This indicates small employee surpluses for this group of employ-
ees.
to be an important feature behind the relationship between job mobility and the wage
residual.
20Table 4: Probit model estimates. Regression of the separation decision on wage residual variation






Constant -0.980 *** 0.008
(continued:)
wage residual
1(-84.7,-26.3) 0.164 *** 0.011 Tenure (<=2) 0.359 *** 0.008
wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) 0.007 0.012  interacted with 
wage residual (3.7,22.1) 0.035 *** 0.012   wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) -0.030 *** 0.011
wage residual (22.1,133.8) 0.158 *** 0.011   wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) 0.024 ** 0.011
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) -0.011 0.011
Female -0.118 *** 0.006   wage residual (22.1,133.8) -0.110 *** 0.011
 interacted with 
  wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) 0.070 *** 0.009 Tenure (6,9) -0.203 *** 0.010
  wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) 0.059 *** 0.009  interacted with 
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) -0.026 *** 0.009   wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) -0.048 *** 0.014
  wage residual (22.1,133.8) 0.108 *** 0.008   wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) -0.007 0.014
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) 0.027 * 0.014
Age(<=30) 0.273 *** 0.008   wage residual (22.1,133.8) 0.019 0.014
 interacted with 
  wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) -0.036 *** 0.011 Tenure (10+) -0.384 *** 0.010
  wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) 0.027 ** 0.012  interacted with 
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) -0.051 *** 0.011   wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) -0.043 *** 0.014
  wage residual (22.1,133.8) -0.111 *** 0.011   wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) -0.005 0.014
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) 0.001 0.014
Age(41,50) -0.145 *** 0.008   wage residual (22.1,133.8) -0.005 0.014
 interacted with 
  wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) 0.005 0.011 Copenhagen dummy 0.060 *** 0.007
  wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) -0.021 * 0.011  interacted with 
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) 0.007 0.011   wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) -0.049 *** 0.009
  wage residual (22.1,133.8) -0.021 * 0.011   wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) -0.028 *** 0.010
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) -0.005 0.009
Age(50+) -0.221 *** 0.011   wage residual (22.1,133.8) 0.012 0.009
 interacted with 
  wage residual (-84.7,-26.3) 0.034 ** 0.014
  wage residual (-26.3,-10.2) 0.010 0.015
  wage residual (3.7,22.1) 0.011 0.015
  wage residual (22.1,133.8) -0.005 0.015
Notes: 1: "wage residual (-84.7,-26.3)" is a dummy which takes the value one if the wage residual is in the first quintile of the 
wage residual distribution with the wage residual being between -84.7 and -26.3 DKK, "wage residual (-26.3,-10.2)" takes the 
value one if the wage residual is the second quintile, etc.; the third quintile (wage residual (-10.2,3.7)) is the omitted/baseline 
category.
The "baseline employee" is male, between 31 and 40 years of age, has tenure between 3 and 5 years, and lives outside 
Copenhagen. 
21Employees with tenure of three to ﬁve years (which is the omitted cat-
egory) have separation rates increasing faster than the other tenure cate-
gorisations when underpaid, which suggests this group of employees to have
favourable outside options compared to actual wages.
Separation rates of employees in the Copenhagen area are high, but do
only increase slightly for underpaid employees; this indicates wages to be
located more closely to the marginal product relative to the alternative wage
for employees in Copenhagen relative to the rest of the country.
The interpretation of the relationship between wage residuals and sep-
aration rates as being a consequence of the locations of individual wages,
alternative wages and productivities has been made explicit in the empirical
model of section 3. The next section takes this model to the data.
5 Estimation Results
This section presents the estimation results of the model which was outlined
in Section 3. Estimation is on the full sample which is described in Table 1.
Wage residuals are measured in 100DKK.
The locations of the alternative wage and marginal product distributions
are made conditional on variables which are motivated by the rent-sharing
hypotheses of Section 2: the list of controls contains dummies for gender, the
Copenhagen area - which is presumed to be correlated with labour market
thickness - tenure and age. The same set of variables is used for the indi-
vidual speciﬁc standard error estimates of the alternative wage and marginal
product distributions.
Table 5 presents coeﬃcient estimates of the surpluses of equation (15) and
(16). These are based on the likelihood function (17), with the probability
of no separation speciﬁed as (13). The coeﬃcients (1)-(9) in column (1) are
the estimates of e β1. Recall E(f awi,t)=−exp(xi,te β1)+( γ∗
1/σμ1) × w∗
i:t h e
expected employee surplus Ewi − E(awi,t) is a positive function of e β1,a n d
the alternative wage estimate is negatively related to e β1.T h e c o e ﬃcients
(1)-(9) in column (4) are the estimates of e β2. These are again positively
related to the employer surplus.
The coeﬃcients in row (10) are the estimates of e γ1,a n de γ2, respectively,
recall exp(e γ2) is negatively related to the employer surplus. The coeﬃcients
(11)-(18) describe estimated heteroscedasticity in unobservables: the esti-
22mates of b β1are in column (1), and the coeﬃcients (11)-(18) in column (4) are
the estimates of b β2.
C o l u m n( 3 )p r e s e n t sq u i tp r o b a b i l i t i e so fi n d i v i d u a l sw i t hz e r ow a g er e s i d -
ual, 1 − F(exp(xi,te β1)),a n da l lxi except the constant term and the dummy
variable under consideration being equal to zero. Column (6) presents 1 −
F(exp(xi,te β2)), which is the predicted lay-oﬀ probability of an individual with
zero wage residual.
Estimation results of Table 5 can be summarised as follows:
Expected lay-oﬀ rates are high and suggest labour demand to be an im-
portant determinant of invidual labour mobility.
The estimates of e γ1 and e γ2 are non-zero, which is a condition for the
identiﬁcation of the model. The relatively low sizes of these coeﬃcients imply
wage-separation rate relationships in the data to be weak, which (again)
suggests that the correlations between the wage residual and the alternative
wage on the one hand and the marginal product on the other should be
assumed to be strictly positive, i.e., γ∗
j > 0 ,j=1 ,2.
As a consequence, coeﬃcient estimates will be compared relative to the




For women, separation probability increases strongly when wage residuals
become large in absolute value. Unobserved heterogeneity of the alternative
wage and the marginal product appear to be small16. These ﬁndings are
best described by low surpluses, which are a consequence of a high alterna-
tive wages and a low expected marginal products. In particular, women’s
employee surplus is suggested to be about (by coeﬃcient (2), column (1):
1−exp(−0.397) = 0.32) 32% smaller, and the employer surplus is suggested
to be (coeﬃcient (2), column (4)) 42% smaller than for the ’standard’ person
(who is male).
16The estimated standard deviation of unobserved heterogeneity in the alternative wage
is about 40% (by coeﬃcient (21), column (1): exp(−0.523) = 0.59) lower for women com-
pared to men. The corresponding standard deviation estimate for the marginal product
is about (coeﬃcient (21), column (4)) 44% lower .
2324These ﬁndings must of course be interpreted in the light of the assump-
tions of the model. In any case, they point to the size of the total surplus
being smaller for women than for men, one potential explanation of which
may be high importance of general relative to speciﬁc human capital in oc-
cupations with large shares of women. Further, regarding the sharing of the
surplus, it is suggested that women are getting a larger percentage than men,
as their estimated employee surpluses are larger relative to the employer sur-
pluses. Consequently, unlike Nekby (2003), there is no evidence of gender
discrimination with regard to rent extraction diﬀerences.
Employee mobility is less sensitive to wage residual variation in Copen-
hagen compared to the rest of the country (by the estimates in row (12)).
This suggests that high separation rates are not a result of low surpluses - as
would be a result of low mobility and adjustment costs in metropolitan areas.
In this case, separation rates would react strongly to wage residual variation.
Instead, weak wage-separation probability relationships in Copenhagen are
consistent with both high heterogeneity in alternative wages and productiv-
ities (by the coeﬃcients in row (2)), and high surpluses (by the coeﬃcients
in row (3)). Consequently, the ﬁnding of high lay-oﬀ rates in Copenhagen
(coeﬃcient (3), column (6)) is explained by a large variance rather than a low
mean (relative to the predicted wage) of the marginal product distribution.
One potential explanation for regional diﬀerences in the estimates could be
industry structure diﬀerences, e.g., jobs in Copenhagen requiring relatively
large amounts of speciﬁc human capital.
Regarding tenure, the ﬁnding of high separation rates for employees with
tenure less than or equal to two years are explained by (1) high employee
surpluses joint with large heterogeneity in alternative wages (coeﬃcients (4)
and (13) in column (1)), and (2) low employer surplusses joint with small
unobserved heterogeneity in marginal products (coeﬃcients (4) and (13) in
column(4)). It is suggested that paying short-tenured employees badly only
slightly increases their probability of separation.
This is not the case for low age employees. For this group of employees,
separation rates are increasing strongly at the low end of the wage residual
distribution. This is reﬂe c t e di nc o e ﬃcient (7), column (1); it indicates that
the expected employee surplus of young employees is small.
The high separation rates of young and short-tenured employees are in-
dicated to be a consequence of small rents for young employees (coeﬃcients
in row (7), columns (1) and (4)), and of low marginal products relative to
the predicted wages for short-tenured employees (coeﬃcient (4), column (4)).
25This suggests that these employees’ wages are close to the ﬁrm’s maximum
willingness to pay.
The coeﬃcients related to heteroscedasticity suggest that the higher the
tenure, the easier it becomes to predict quits from wage variation (coeﬃcients
(13)-(15), row (1)); minimum acceptable wages become more well-deﬁned the
longer an employee has been with the ﬁrm. Employee surpluses grow with
tenure, but when wages get close to the alternative wage estimate, quit rates
increase strongly.
Employees with long tenure are characterised by weak wage-separation
relationships (coeﬃcient (15), row (4)) and low separation rates at the high
end of the wage residual distribution (coeﬃcient (6), column (4)). This
indicates that this group of employees has high marginal product on average.
Consequently, asking for higher wages only slightly increases the expected
lay-oﬀ probability of long-tenured employees.
Regarding the sharing of the match speciﬁc surpluses, the tenure and age
coeﬃcients indicate that the employer surplus is increasing with tenure and
age at higher rates than the employee surplus: the coeﬃcients (6) and (9)
in row (4) are of larger magnitude than the coeﬃcients (6) and (9) in row
(1). This is in accordance with the hypothesis that costs and gains of speciﬁc
investments are shared over the contract period (Becker (1962), Hashimoto
(1981)) rather than deferred compensation being a general feature of the
data.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper considers the relationship between wages and employer-employee
separations. In particular, it providese v i d e n c ef r o mD a n i s hr e g i s t e rd a t a
that the relationship between the residual of a wage regression and separation
probability is U-shaped. Further, employees with positive (negative) wage
residuals do typically experience wage drops (increases) when they separate
their employers.
These observations are consistent with the assumption that wage residuals
are positively correlated with employee surpluses, and negatively correlated
with employer surpluses.
This paper presents a model which is based on this assumption, and which
can be used to learn about individual-speciﬁca l t e r n a t i v ew a g e sa n dm a r g i n a l
26productivities from cross-section data. A consequence of the identifying as-
sumption is that an employer-employee separation is associated with a higher
probability of being a lay-oﬀ (quit) the higher (lower) is the wage residual
before the separation takes place.
T h eq u i ta n dl a y - o ﬀ probabilities depend on where wages locate relative
to the thresholds which trigger quits and lay-oﬀs. These are the minimum
acceptable wage from the point of view of the employee - which depend on
the employees’ alternative wages - and the maximum acceptable wage from
the point of view of the ﬁrm - which depends on the employee’s marginal
product.
Individuals diﬀer by how their separation probabilities are related to vari-
ation in wage residuals. These diﬀerences are interpreted as being due to dif-
ferent locations of wages relative to the individual-speciﬁc thresholds which
trigger separations. This paper gives a model which enables me to estimate
the thresholds (up to a scaling factor) which are consistent with this inter-
pretation. These estimates can be deduced from register data, in which there
is no explicit distinction between quits and lay-oﬀs.
The model is estimated on a cross-section of a large Danish matched
employer-employee dataset. Conditional on the set-up of the estimation,
e.g., the sample, functional form assumptions, and symmetry assumptions
regarding unobservables, the estimation results indicate that a large share of
separations are lay-oﬀs. Comparisons between groups of employees indicate
that ﬁrms appropriate large shares of the returns to tenure, women to have
smaller rents than men but they appropriate a larger share, and that there
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences of rent sharing coeﬃcients across regions dis-
tinguished by their labour market thickness. In other words, results are in
accordance with ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital theory rather than the deferred
compensation hypothesis. They do not indicate gender discrimination due
to rent extraction diﬀerences and do not support the hypothesis that rent
sharing is determined by labour market thickness.
These results are of course subject to the assumptions of the model, which
future work on this issue may attempt to relax to increase the precision of the
estimates. Instruments or (quasi-) experimental data could be used to ﬁnd
wage variation which is orthogonal to alternative wages and productivities.
The assumption of wage rigidity could be avoided if there was information
on declined wage oﬀers in the data.
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